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(WIPO) adopted a development agenda to consider different intellectual property regimes appropriate to the circumstances of a particular country or region.
2 One of the objectives of TRIPS is to establish a mutually supportive relationship between the WTO and WIPO. 3 The application of TRIPS to developing countries has become even more important with the full entry into force of their patent obligations on January 1, 2005.
In this article, we examine the tension between access to patented medicine and the protection of patent rights in the context of TRIPS. We will challenge conventional legal wisdom regarding differential interpretation of international legal obligations and conventional economic views regarding the relationship between international intellectual property law and research incentives to invent medicines to treat global diseases in developing countries. In our analysis of the economics of pharmaceutical patents, we will distinguish between global diseases (which occur in both developed and developing countries) and neglected diseases (which occur overwhelmingly in developing countries, rather than in developed countries).
the TRIPS Agreement for least-developed country members for certain obligations with respect to pharmaceutical products" (IP/C/25), available at http://www.wto.org; World Trade Organization, Draft
Waiver, "Least-developed country members -obligations under article 70.9 of the trips agreement with respect to pharmaceutical products", submitted to the WTO General Council for approval on 8 
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We present a new analytical framework for determining differential treatment of developing and least-developed countries and apply this framework in the context of TRIPS. 4 We propose that the balance of legal rights between producers and users of patents be determined on a market-by-market basis, rather than on a global basis.
This article is organized as follows. First, we provide an overview of key TRIPS obligations and exceptions relating to patents, as amended by the Doha Round negotiations.
Second, we analyze the legal effect of WTO provisions on special and differential treatment of developing countries on TRIP S law and policy, taking into account the 2004 Appellate
Body ruling in European Communities -Tariff Preferences for Developing Countries.
Third, we analyze the consistency of global patent rights with the economic and developmental objectives of the WTO. We conclude that strong patent rights in developing countries may contradict these objectives. We propose two alternative solutions. First, we
propose interpreting exceptions to patent rights based on objective measures of economic and development needs. Second, we develop a formula for determine the circumstances in which the patent obligations of WTO members should be waived.
II. Overview of TRIPS Obligations and Exceptions
TRIPS requires patents to provide patent owners with the exclusive right to prevent third parties from making, using, selling or importing a patented product without the owner's consent. 5 Articles 30 and 31 authorize exceptions to these rights. Article 30 4 Our focus is on differential treatment, as opposed to differential pricing of drugs. For a discussion of the latter issue in the context of TRIPS, see Peter J. Hammer, Differential Pricing of Essential AIDS Drugs:
Markets, Politics and Public Health, 5 J. INTL ECON. L. 883 (2002) .
5 TRIPS Article 28.1. 6 permits "limited exceptions". Article 31 permits WTO members to allow "other use of the subject matter of the patent", and covers compulsory licensing of patents. The term "other use" means "use other than that allowed under Article 30". 6 Under Article 31, a government may issue a compulsory license authorizing the government or a third party to produce generic drugs without the authorization of the patent holder where negotiations fail to obtain authorization on reasonable commercial terms. 7 However, the use of the patent must be "predominantly" to supply the domestic market 8 and the patent holder must be paid adequate remuneration, based on the economic value of the license. 9 The negotiation requirement may be waived in cases of national emergency, extreme urgency, or noncommercial public use. 10 Members are not obliged to comply with the negotiation requirement nor to predominantly serve the domestic market where the use is permitted to remedy anti-competitive practices.
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The TRIPS provisions relating to compulsory licensing strengthen a government's position in price negotiations with patent holders by permitting the government to issue a compulsory license to manufacture drugs, rather than purchase them from the patent owner.
For example, where a government provides drugs to patients through a public healthcare scheme, it meets the necessary conditions to halt price negotiations because generic versions manufactured under compulsory license would serve a non-commercial public use 6 TRIPS, footnote 7.
7 TRIPS, Article 31(b).
8 TRIPS, Article 31(f).
9 TRIPS, Article 31(h).
10 TRIPS, Article 31(b).
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and predominantly supply the domestic market. Since the term "adequate remuneration" is not defined, patent owners can not predict with certainty what compensation they will receive if a government abandons negotiations. 12 This gives the patent owners an incentive to determine the price through negotiation.
The ability to manufacture drugs under compulsory license provides developing countries with bargaining power to extract price concessions for patented drugs or to issue compulsory licenses when negotiations fail. However, this bargaining power applies only to countries that have the capacity to produce generic drugs under compulsory licenses issued to government laboratories or private generic producers. Many developing countries do not have the capacity to manufacture generic drugs. This weakens their bargaining position substantially unless they can import generic drugs from another country that has issued a compulsory license on their behalf. To serve as an effective bargaining chip, the threat to issue a compulsory license to government or private pharmaceutical manufacturers must be 8 credible. The TRIPS Declaration acknowledged this problem in Paragraph 6, which provides as follows:
6. We recognize that WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem...
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In order to implement Paragraph 6, the WTO General Council agreed to amend
Article 31(f) and 31(h). 14 The Paragraph 6 Decision waives the obligations of an exporter under Article 31(f) (to supply predominantly the domestic market) so that any country with manufacturing capacity can issue a compulsory license to produce generic drugs for export to countries that have insufficient or no manufacturing capacity, subject to several conditions. 15 The Article 31(h) requirement to compensate the patent holder for the economic value of the license is altered so that the exporting country must pay 13 TRIPS Declaration, supra note 1, paragraph 6.
14 See Decision of August 30, 2003, paragraph 11, which provides, "This Decision, including the waivers granted in it, shall terminate for each Member on the date on which an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement replacing its provisions takes effect for that Member". 17 Ibid, paragraph 2. As we note above, calculating this compensation will be a difficult task. As we note below, the value of the market may be very little in the poorest countries, particularly where the patent holders were already selling the product at cost. 18 Ibid, paragraph 1(b).
19 All other members are required to notify the Council for TRIPS of its intention to use the system set out in 21 Until their accession to the European Union, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia agreed that they would only use the system as importers in situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency. These countries further agreed that upon their accession to the European Union, they will opt out of using the system as importers. Other
Members that agreed that they would only use the system as importers in situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency are Hong Kong China, Israel, Korea, Kuwait, Macao China, Mexico, commitment have agreed, in effect, not to use the system for non-commercial public use;
that is, not to use the system simply to lower the general cost of purchasing medicine for public health care systems, for example. These commitments resolve an issue that was of concern to the pharmaceutical industry-that countries that lacked manufacturing capacity, but that could afford to pay the full price of patented medicine, would import cheaper generic versions instead. The fourth category consists of the members that do not fall into the first three categories.
In order to ensure that imports occur only within the parameters set out in the Paragraph 6 Decision and that medicines supplied unde r this system do not make their way back to markets that have been carved out of the system under these commitments, members must have laws in place to prevent the diversion of medicine supplied under the system. 22 All importing countries, regardless of the ir development status, must also take "reasonable measures within their means, proportionate to their administrative capacities and to the risk of trade diversion" to prevent the re-export of the products they import under this system. 23 The types of measures that they must take are not specified. Where developing countries and least -developed countries experience difficulty implementing this provision, developed countries must provide technical and financial assistance to facilitate its implementation. 24 However, WTO members are free to determine whether to permit parallel imports without these laws being subject to WTO dispute settlement procedures.
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Parallel imports involve products sold by the patent owner in one market that are then imported into another market without the patent owner's approval.
There is no restriction on the countries that are eligible to export. However, there is a series of procedural requirements and conditions that exporters are to follow, in addition to the compensation requirement noted above. Moreover, the obligations under Article 31(f) are waived only "to the extent necessary for the purposes of production of a pharmaceutical product(s) and its export to an eligible importing Member(s)". 26 A further necessity test is introduced by requiring that the license restrict the authorization to "only the amount necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing Member". 25 TRIPS Article 6. Also see TRIPS Declaration, supra note 1, paragraph 5(d), which provides: "The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each member free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the MFN and national treatment provisions of Articles 3 and 4." Under a system of international exhaustion of patents, the patent owner cannot prevent the importation of his own product from a foreign country once it has been sold there; that is, parallel imports.
26 Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 1, paragraph 2.
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With the exception of least-developed countries, importing countries must specify in their notification to the WTO the names and quantities of the products needed. 28 They must also confirm that they have granted or intend to grant a compulsory license in accordance with TRIPS Article 31. 29 Finally, they must establish that they have no or insufficient manufacturing capac ity in the pharmaceutical sector for the product in question in one of two ways. Either they have no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector at all or they have examined this capacity (excluding that owned or controlled by the patent holder) and found that it is insufficient to meet their needs. 30 The Paragraph 6 system will no longer apply once it is established that the capacity has become sufficient to meet its needs.
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The aim of the Paragraph 6 Decision is to increase the availability of life-saving 
III. The Effect of Special and Differential Treatment in WTO Law and Policy
The conventional view of treaty interpretation is that legal rights and obligations must be interpreted in a uniform manner for all of the parties to the treaty. WTO rules are not so rigid or so inflexible as not to leave room for reasoned judgements in confronting the endless and ever-changing ebb and flow of real facts in real cases in the real world. They will serve the multilateral trading system best if they are interpreted with that in mind. This raises the issue of how to determine the appropriate level of special and differential treatment and the correct interpretation and application of special and differential treatment provisions from one agreement to the next. The basic purpose of special and differential treatment is to stimulate sustainable economic development in accordance with the needs of developing countries. 45 Thus, both the needs of developing countries and the impact of special and differential treatment on their development should be taken into account (1) when interpreting special and differential treatment provisions and (2) when assessing the appropriateness of special and differential treatment as a policy. 45 The WTO Agreement preamble refers to "sustainable development". A reasonable interpretation is that this refers to the concept that was developed in the Brundtland Report. While this ambiguous concept means different things to different people, sustainable economic development is generally accepted as constituting a core aspect of the term. See World Commission on Environment and Development, OUR COMMON FUTURE, 
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Before applying this analysis to TRIPS law and policy on patents, the specific objectives of TRIPS need to be determined. However, these objective must be understood in light of the overall objectives of the WTO Agreement relating to developing countries.
The relationship between these two sets of objectives should be harmonious, in light of the principle of effective treaty interpretation and the presumption against conflicts in international law.
Two core objectives of TRIPS are to achieve a balance between the rights of produc ers and users of intellectual property and to promote development. There are a number of TRIPS provisions that support an approach to balancing TRIPS rights and obligations that differs with the level of development of the member in question. These provisions support the view that the balance to be struck between producers and users should shift in favor of developing and least-developed countries when they are the users under consideration. That is, the correct balance must differ from one market to the next, rather than be universally applicable without regard to the conditions existing in legal system in a given market depends on the conditions prevailing in that market. 60 Thus, the proposition that some legal systems are more effective than others in promoting economic development is incorrect. In the following section, we argue that patents laws, like legal systems in general, will be more effective in promoting innovation and economic development where their design, interpretation and impleme ntation take into account prevailing conditions on a market-by-market basis.
IV. The Economic Impact of Patents and Their Effect on Development Needs
In the context of drug patents, striking the right balance between the rights of producers and users requires an analysis under the development needs and economic impact tests to determine whether patents rights (the rights of producers) or compulsory licensing rights (the rights of users) are more effective in promoting innovation that meets the needs of developing countries. This raises economic issues regarding the effect that patents have on innovation and economic development and whether drug patents are conducive to social and economic welfare.
The argument for patent rights in developing countries is based on several assumptions regarding the general economic impact of patents and the specific economic impact of patents in developing countries: (1) 
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However, the economic issues are different for global diseases (diseases that are prevalent in both developed and developing countries, such as HIV/AIDS) and neglected diseases (developing country diseases that are not prevalent in developed countries, such as malaria). This is because the markets for drugs that treat the diseases are different.
In some cases, it may be difficult to determine whether a disease is global or neglected. For example, HIV/AIDS straddles both the developed world and the developing world, which suggests tha t it is best characterized as a global disease. However, the types of HIV infection found commonly in the developing and the developed worlds are not the same. There are many subtypes of HIV-1 (the most commonly occurring HIV infection in humans 
A. Are global patents necessary to provide research incentives for neglected diseases?
The argument in favor of global patents for neglected diseases is as follows. A global patent system will provide research incentives for the development of drugs for neglected diseases. 67 The reason these diseases have been "neglected" by the pharmaceutical industry is due to the general absence of effective patent protection in developing countries prior to the implementation of TRIPS.
Another argument is that the risk of compulsory licensing makes developing countries unattractive for the pharmaceutical industry, even with global patent rights in 66 It is important to note that this issue is distinct from the issues of whether global patent rights lead to differential pricing (Ramsey pricing) and how regulatory capture affects research incentives, issues that have been treated elsewhere in the literature. Regarding the former, see Frederic M. Scherer and Jayashree Watal, Thus, we conclude that global patents do not provide enough incentives for the pharmaceutical companies to develop drugs for neglected diseases, whether due to the stifling effects of patents on innovation or the lack of purchasing power in the affected markets.
Post-TRIPS Options for Access to Patented Medicines in Developing Countries

B. Are global patents necessary to provide research incentives for global diseases?
The argument in favor of global patents for global diseases is as follows. Developed country markets will be undermined through parallel imports unless patents are global, medical treatment in developing countries, the impact on their development needs will be negative and defeat the objectives of the WTO.
The result is that TRIPS obligations regarding patents rights are not effective in meeting the objectives of the WTO Agreement and TRIPS. There are two possible solutions to this problem. The second-best solution is to use the exceptions in TRIPS to achieve a better balance between the rights of users and producers until the patent obligations can be eliminated. Part III, above, laid out the legal basis for differential application of exceptions that use ambiguous language. The first part of this section will will examine specific exceptions in that context. The best solution is to eliminate the obligation of developing countries to provide patent rights for pharmaceutical products.
This solution has been partly achieved for least-developed countries, whose obligations to protect pharmaceutical patents have been delayed until 2016. The second part of this section will propose and index that can be used to determine the circumstances in which patent obligations should be waived.
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A. Solving the Problem through Treaty Interpretation
In the context of patent provisions in TRIPS, the rights conferred on patent owners in Article 28(1) and 33 are expressed in unambiguous terms. The lack of ambiguity in this treaty text makes it difficult to take special and differential treatment into account in its interpretation. However, Article 31 provides a right to make other use of the subject matter of the patent without the authorization of the right holder. The language in this provision is more ambiguous. Thus, the rule of effective treaty interpretation can be applied to take the 81 The procedure for waiving WTO obligations is set out in WTO Agreement Article IX.
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circumstances of the WTO member invoking Article 31 rights into account to ensure that the right is effective for that member in a specific case. Paragraph 31(a) requires that a given authorization "be considered on its individual merits".
Paragraph 31(b) provides that other use may only be permitted if "the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time". This provision contains sufficient ambiguity to be interpreted and applied differently, taking into account variations in circumstances. In this provision, the needs of a developing country in a particular case can be taken into account to determine whether (1) the efforts are adequate, (2) whether the commercial terms and conditions are reasonable,
and (3) The evaluation of the TRIPS consistency of measures taken by countries in the context of the HIV/AIDS pandemic involves balancing the need for the development of new medicine against the need for affordable access to existing treatments. This requires an inquiry into the impact of measures on incentives for patent holders to invest in research on the one hand, and the affordability of medicines in a particular country on the other. With respect to the latter, the balance should favor affordability in cases involving developing countries, especially least-developed countries. As long as developed country markets are secure, the pharmaceutical industry has sufficient incentives to continue research in this field. Thus, in this context, the application of the rules of interpretation of customary international law to TRIPS should favor affordable access in both developing and leastdeveloped countries.
B. Eligibility for Exe mption from Patent Obligations
Determining the correct balance between producers and users of patented products using the current breakdown of WTO members into the three categories of developed, developing and least-developed countries is overly simplistic and inappropriate in the context of pharmaceutical patents. We propose a more sophisticated categorization of the WTO membership in the form of an index that can be used to achieve a more equitable balance between the rights of producers and users on a ma rket-by-market basis. Our proposal is grounded on economic considerations and takes into account the need to apply an objective standard to determine the particular needs of developing countries set out in the WTO Agreement or in multilateral instruments adopted by international organizations.
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This section offers a step by step guide for permitting a country to waive patent protection using a multidimensional approach. The method recognizes the needs of a country not just based on its level of poverty, but also on a threshold level of infection rate of a particular disease.
82 See Tariff Preferences, WTO Doc. WT/DS246/AB/R (2004), supra note 33, para. 163.
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A difficult issue is how to determine the cut-off point with respect to economic development in the case of developing countries. 83 The WTO recognizes as least-developed countries those countries that have been designated as such by the United Nations. proposing that this index be used to justify the erosion of core non-discrimination obligations. Rather, we propose that this index be used for the narrow purpose of achieving equality among WTO members with respect to access to medicine to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other public health crises. Finally, while the legal rights and obligations that flow from the concept of differential treatment for developing countries are far from clear, and the current means of defining developing and least -developed countries in international law are inadequate, we are by no means suggesting this index as the appropriate solution to these highly controversial issues.
There are three specific ingredients to the construction of the index: (1) Disease prevalence; (2) Per capita income; and (3) Poverty rate. We will discuss each in turn.
Disease rate
First, a disease has to be above some threshold rate that will be determined by a world body (such as the World Health Assembly). Leaving it to the discretion of the World Health Assembly to determine the threshold for this criterion is necessary because the appropriate threshold may vary from one disease to the next and because this is a global only. She notes the following. "It is arguable that a country with high income unequally distributed should not be given benefits in the form of low drug prices. Those countries have the resources to deal with poverty domestically." In other words, if the income level is high, then it should be solved using some domestic mechanism like tax-transfer [Her view was expressed in a private email correspondence with the authors.]
The problem with this approach is that it is not at all clear how such a mechanism can be engineered before the country slides back to poverty due to a disease like HIV/AIDS.
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body that has the necessary expertise to make such a decision. Once a country is above that threshold rate for the specific disease, it will qualify for a waiver of patent obligations with respect to the treatments for that disease.
Suppose the disease rate in a country is denoted by r. Suppose, we also have also agreed upon a threshold of the infection rate of the disease t(r Roughly speaking, the threshold is determined by the number of "nodes" that allow the spread of the disease.
If there are many nodes, the spread speeds up. In the case of HIV/AIDS, the identifiable nodes are commercial sex workers and truck drivers. These two groups have been instrumental in the spread of the disease in many parts of the world. There is an intense debate whether these groups should be viewed as the causes of acting as the conduits. For example, in desperately poor economies, many women do not have any way to eke out a living other than selling sex (often for food for subsistence). If they would like to have their clients use condoms, asymmetry of economic power between them and their clients forces them not to use condoms. It matters little who gets the blame. The consequence is literally deadly for them and their clients.
Per capita income
Second, we need to include a country if the income level is low. We will require a threshold value below which a country would qualify for a waiver. Once again, the threshold would be determined by a world body (in this case, the suitable organization would be the World Bank). Thus, if a country has a per capita income 90 below some threshold, it would automatically qualify. Let us denote the per capita income by pci and the corresponding threshold per capita income by t(pci). Expressing in symbols, we will write the criterion as follows: if the per capita income pci < t(pci), then the country automatically qualifies.
Poverty rate
Third, we need to have a mechanism to take into account the poverty level in the country. The average income does not do the job because it papers over the inequality in income among the population. A more appropriate measure of inequality is to include people who are poor in the country in absolute terms. One possibility would be to consider a threshold of some proportion of people who are below some absolute measure of poverty level. The rationale is simple. If there are many people below some absolute poverty level, they cannot afford treatment. A relatively simple measure (available for most countries around the world) is the proportion of people in the country who live on $1 or less a day. So, the criterion would be the following: if the proportion of population (p) with $1 income exceeds some 92 The most common geometric definition of Gini coefficient is based on the Lorenz (or concentration) curve.
It represents cumulative income share as a function of cumulative population share. If a population share is always exactly equal to a share in overall income then there is a situation of perfect equality. 93 Technically, Gini coefficient is a relative measure of inequality.
94 Both are around 38%. The lower the number, the more equal the income. Conversely, the higher the number, the higher the inequality. Thus, a zero (percent) Gini coefficient means everybody in the economy has the same income. On the other hand 100% value of the Gini coefficient implies that one person has all the income in the country and everyone else has zero income. Of course, in real life, neither extreme is observable. In real life, it ranges from around 25% (for countries such as Belgium, Finland and the Czech Republic) to over 60% (such as Brazil or Sierra Leone).
threshold t(p), then the country would automatically qualify. In symbols, if p > t(p), then a country automatically qualifies for a waiver.
Thus, there are three possible indices that could be used for determining the countries that qualify. We combine the three to arrive at a single criterion. In plain English, if a country qualifies using any of the above threshold criteria, it should qualify. We can use the following criterion that include all three measures using a compact notation:
If maximum {r -t(r), t(pci) -pci, p -t(p)} > 0, the country qualifies. This criterion ensures that if (1) the disease rate (r) is above the pre-determined threshold (t(r)), then the country qualifies, (2) if the per capita income (pci) is below the predetermined threshold (t(pci)), then the country qualifies, and (3) if the proportion of population (p) is above certain thr eshold (t(p)), then the country qualifies.
Although the measure above is useful, it is not entirely satisfactory. Suppose a country has all the above problems but it fails each threshold criterion by some amount and therefore fails to qualify. Clearly, we will need a method of "adding" each "score" to come up with an aggregate value that reflect the issue in all three dimensions. There are two ways of achieving this. We discuss them below.
Let max(r) be the country with the maximum infection rate. Let min(pci) be the country with minimum per capita income. Let max(p) be the country with the maximum proportion of people below $1 per day per capita income. We construct the following absolute index (Absolute Compassion Sentiment Index or Absolute CSI):
Absolute CSI for a country = [r/max(r) + min(pci)/pci + p/max(p)]/3
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The rationale for the formula is as follows. If a country hits the maximum infection rate, minimum income level and maximum number of poor people in the pool of all countries, the CSI will hit a maximum of 1. We can set a predetermined value of the Absolute CSI such that any country with the value of the index above that level would qualify for a waiver.
Since this measure will never hit zero, some people might consider this measure unsatisfactory. We can adjust that by considering a modified version that measures different dimensions in relative terms. Thus, we construct the Relative Compassion Sentiment Index: To see why we take such ratios, consider the first one: I(r). If, for a given country, the infection rate r is the highest among all countries, the n the index I(r) = 1. On the other hand, if the infection rate r is the lowest among all countries, I(r) = 0. Similarly, if the per capita income (pci) is the lowest among all countries, then the index I(pci) = 1. On the other hand if the per capita income pci is the highest among all countries, then the index I(pci) = 0. If the $1 a day population p is the highest among all the countries in question, then I(p) = 1 whereas if it is the lowest, then I(p) = 0. Thus, the relative CSI is a measure bounded by 0 46 and 1 as two extremes. By construction, the relative CSI could touch the limits for the best (in that case, it will touch 0) and the worst (in that case, it will touch 1) case scenarios.
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With the Relative CSI (RCSI), the criterion should specify a threshold (t): if the RCSI > t, the country should qualify under the composite measure for the most favorable level of treatment available. To incorporate this measure in our overall criterion, we propose the following:
If maximum {r -t(r), t(pci) -pci, p -t(p), RCSI -t} > 0, then a country should qualify for the most favorable level of treatment.
Our measure for determining "economic needs" is quite consistent with the long run interest of the pharmaceutical companies. Consider the case of Botswana. It was called the "miracle country" of Africa up until the early 1990s. The real GDP of Botswana grew at a rate of 8-9% per year over more than a decade. However, with the devastating effects of HIV/AIDS, the country is slowly sinking. The life expectancy at birth has fallen by a decade. HIV/AIDS is reversing much of the economic gains of the past decades. If the pharmaceutical industry insists on protection of their drug patents, it will generate very little profit now. Worse, they will have to forego all the futur e growth in profits they might have generated in the future. Botswana will recede into the backwaters of economic development.
The use of our index allows these types of countries to return to economic growth.
That process should eventually push them over the threshold value of the index so that they 95 It should be noted that the worst outcome country in one measure may not be the worst outcome country in terms of another measure. Thus, it is quite probable that in the list of all countries we will never observe the extreme value 1. Similarly the best outcome country in one measure may not be the best outcome country in another. Thus, we might not observe the extreme value 0 in a sample of countries.
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no longer qualify for the waiver. Without such measures, these countries will be caught in a vicious circle and, therefore, will never generate the level of purchasing power needed to create a market for the pharmaceutical industry.
The index allows us to redress this balance of incentives through a mechanism that is implemented, using objective standards recongnized by international bodies that represent all interested parties. The index serves to promote affordable access to medicine using criteria that are tailored to address the specific circumstances surrounding global or neglected diseases, which is more appropriate than the UN measure.
VI. Conclusion
The HIV/AIDS epidemic has sparked a broader debate over the right balance to strike between the rights of patent holders and the needs of developing countries.
Pharmaceutical companies are concerned about the precedent that may be set for intellectual property rights as a result of the measures taken to address HIV/AIDS.
However, we conclude that their concerns are largely unfounded. 
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versions under compulsory license (or of importing from generic producers in other countries) is lower than the cost of buying from the patent owner, the country will do the former. This price competition ensures that the drug in question is supplied at the lowest possible cost. Thus, the level of bargaining power a country enjoys ultimately affects the price it pays for medicine and the affordability of treatment for global and neglected diseases. This has a direct impact on the number of patients that get access to treatment. To put least-developed countries and developing countries that lack manufacturing capacity on a similar footing, they need to have equal access to generic products. To achieve equality of bargaining power, countries with generic manufacturing capacity need to use the threat of compulsory licensing on behalf of those who lack the capacity, to strengthen the hand of the latter in price negotiations. on their level of development. However, the differential treatment that was originally set out in TRIPS applied with clarity only with respect to the transition periods members enjoyed. The TRIPS Declaration represents a partial acknowledgement that the differential treatment that was initially set out in TRIPS was inadequate, extending the transition period for least-developed countries and recognizing that WTO members did not enjoy equal access to patent exceptions due to the lack of manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector. The Paragraph 6 Decision further refines how differential treatment is to operate in practice with respect to compulsory licensing for export. However, it conditions access to legal rights on the level of economic development in a manner that does not resolve the fundamental issue of equal access to legal rights and the access to medicine that these imply.
We have argued that conditioning the application of TRIPS obligations and exceptions based on the categorization of countries as developed, developing and leastdeveloped, determining membership in the latter category based on the UN method, is inappropriate when it comes to patents for medicines. We have proposed two alternative methods of rectifying this problem, one based on treaty interpretation and the other based on objective criteria. In the context of global and neglected diseases, uniformity of TRIPS obligations and exceptions relating to patented medicine impose unnecessarily high costs on users and poor distribution of costs and benefits among producers and users of intellectual property. Uniform rules can have disparate effects that worsen inequalities rather than correct them. To achieve the correct balance between the rights of producers 50 and users of patented medicine, a broader range of factors must be taken into account than are currently used in the WTO and UN contexts.
We have questioned the underlying premise of TRIPS that strong global patent rights are necessary to ensure innovation. Even if we accept the premise that patents rights are necessary in every WTO member, regardless of the member's level of development, our proposed index shows that the UN classification of countries is an inappropriate basis for achieving an equitable balance between the rights of patent owners and users.
